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Overview—This paper describes the Medicare coverage
process for emerging technologies and the ways it has
changed over time. Issues addressed include both the
national coverage process and local medical review
policies, which account for 90 percent of the coverage
determinations. The paper also includes a discussion of
the relationship between the coverage process and
technology assessment, payment systems and the ongoing
debate over coverage criteria and levels of evidence.

The complex process that determines whether and
when new and emerging technologies become covered
under the Medicare program has changed over the years
and is still in a state of flux. Its complexity underscores
many of the difficult choices that Medicare, as both a
payer and a purchaser, must make on behalf of its
beneficiaries. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), recently renamed the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), in the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), has long
been responsible for making national Medicare coverage determinations. These determinations do not,
however, occur in isolation. Rather, they are closely
linked to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) safety
and effectiveness determinations, to reimbursement and
payment policies, and to coding decisions.
FDA approval, the green light for marketing a product,
is granted once safety and effectiveness have been established. The FDA imprimatur alone, however, does not
guarantee that a product will be covered by Medicare.
Because the threshold for efficacy depends upon the type
of technology—that is, whether it is (a) a breakthrough
product, which requires a rigorous FDA approval process
referred to as premarket approval, or PMA, or (b) a product that is “substantially equivalent” to one already on the
market, which goes through a more routine premarket
notification known as a 510(k) review—clinical data are
not required in all instances. Clinical data are, however,
required for all Medicare coverage decisions.
Coverage involves deciding whether or not a particular service or product is eligible for payment, while
reimbursement involves determining the methods and
amounts of payment for covered services and products.
For various reasons, payment systems (for example,
inpatient prospective payment, physician fee schedules,
and outpatient prospective payment) are built upon
different coding systems. (The Forum is planning to hold
a separate meeting on coding and payment issues.)
Various methodologies and formulas have been legislated
to determine the actual level of payment various providers

receive for various products and services. Table 1 (see
page 3) shows three payment systems and their related
coding schemes and payment bases.
These payment systems and their relationship to the
coverage process are extremely complex. In fact, at
times the coverage and payment processes appear to
meld into one. That is, discrete national coverage
decisions rendered by CMS and local carrier coverage
decisions (both of which are more fully described later
in this background paper) represent only two of the
ways in which technologies enter the Medicare program.
Another point of entry for technology is through the
various payment systems. Both the inpatient prospective
payment system (PPS) and the outpatient prospective
payment system are based upon bundled payments—
diagnosis-related groups, or DRGs, for the inpatient
PPS and the newly created ambulatory payment classifications, or APCs, for the outpatient PPS. Based upon
certain formulas, providers are reimbursed for the
services, including technologies, that are used within a
given payment bundle. In this situation, the provider
(not the government) is the purchaser and makes both
the coverage and the reimbursement decisions. New
technologies can therefore obtain reimbursement as
long as there is a code and a bundled payment to which
they can be attached. Analysts point out, however, that
new technologies entering payment systems in this
manner are rarely evaluated for efficacy. Such systems
also present a challenge when a new technology does
not fit well within an established payment bundle. At
that point the government gets involved.
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Table 1
Medicare Reimbursement Payment Systems
with Their Related Coding Schemes and Payment Bases
Payment System

Coding Scheme

Payment Basis

Inpatient Prospective Payment System

ICD-9-CM*

Diagnosis Related Group (DRG)

Physician Fee Schedule

HCPCS,** CPT†

Relative Value Unit (RVU)

Outpatient Prospective Payment System

HCPCS, CPT

Ambulatory Payment Classification (APC)

*

International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification
HCFA Common Procedural Coding System
†
Current Procedural Terminology
**

In order to evaluate and assess technologies for
coverage and payment purposes, payers require data
and scientific evidence. This information is key to the
coverage process as well. To fully appreciate these
processes, it helps to step back and see where coverage
fits within the broader picture of technology evaluation.

ASSESSING TECHNOLOGIES
Technology assessment is the foundation upon
which regulatory and purchasing decision-making takes
place. Wade M. Aubry, M.D. chairman of the Medical
Advisory Panel of the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, summarizes what he sees as the four goals of
technology assessment:1






Determine the technology’s effect on health outcomes, such as length and quality of life (for example, functional status).
Compare beneficial outcomes to harmful ones.
Compare alternative technologies for a given set of
indications.
Use the results to make rational decisions related to
coverage and medical practice, including physicians
and patients choosing among treatment options.

Technology assessment in the United States began
in earnest in the early1970s, when the relationship
between medical technology and health care costs came
more sharply into focus. The seventies witnessed the
birth of revolutionary technologies, such as CT scanning, electronic fetal monitoring, and mammography.
The earliest cardiac therapies, such as cardiac
catheterization, were making their way into medical
practice. These big-ticket technologies paved the way
for a national technology assessment agenda.2

Over the years, technology assessment has been
transformed from a regulatory model, originally intended to constrain the premature use of technology,
into a more clinical approach with a focus on health
outcomes and, in the view of many, as a tool to manage
costs. The establishment of the Agency for Health Care
Policy and Research (now called AHRQ, the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality), and the concurrent development of practice guidelines put a new spin
on assessment protocols, stretching the boundaries of
technology assessment. No longer was technology
assessment solely concerned with safety, efficacy, and
effectiveness. Today, assessors are also interested in the
appropriateness and value of a medical technology.
Technology assessment occurs at every phase of a
technology’s “life,” from idea conception to FDA approval through coverage and payment determinations and
ultimately to purchasing decisions. Because of the nature
of medical device innovation (which differs greatly from
that of prescription drug innovation), manufacturers have
expressed concerns over how and when different kinds of
device technologies are assessed.
At its core, device innovation is a dynamic, complex,
and incremental process. It is marked by uncertainties
and unexpected twists, and it rarely moves in a linear,
predictable pattern. It spans many different stages and
activities—from development of a new idea, to diffusion of a new device, to refinement of an existing
product. Among the host of factors influencing device
innovation are market forces; federal policies, such as
product liability, patents, and funding of research; and
patient needs and demands. But perhaps most significantly, device innovation is a process that is rooted in
the active day-to-day interchange between device users
[physicians] and device manufacturing companies. The
relationship that often develops among these parties
during the early stages of device innovation can be
viewed as the beginning of a long-running dialogue.3
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The medical technology industry has voiced concern
that premature assessment of a technology may limit or
even deny the possibility of discovering new and improved applications of the technology in clinical practice. It is often the rule, rather than the exception, that
once physicians or other providers begin to use a product, they discover additional possibilities. These can take
the form of (a) technical adjustments or modifications
that would allow additional capacity or greater speed or
(b) a new use for patients with different conditions.
Assessment of technology before it has an opportunity
to diffuse precludes new and improved applications for
patients, according to device manufacturers. Assessors
on the other hand, point out that diffusion of a technology prior to a thorough assessment can preclude the
technology from ever being properly evaluated.

reasonable and necessary are specified, precise definitions do not exist.4 Historically, reasonable and
necessary have been largely defined by the local
physician community.

Nowhere is the evaluation of medical technology a
more heated issue than for those technologies currently
assessed by CMS—particularly as CMS continues to craft
its Medicare coverage criteria. Some observers are
concerned that what is being assessed is not just the
technology, but how medicine is practiced (raising, for
example, questions such as where this test fits in with the
others already being performed). Regulating the practice
of medicine, critics assert, oversteps the legal boundaries
defining the Medicare coverage process.

Ultimately, the vast majority of Medicare coverage
decisions are made by its contractors, known as fiscal
intermediaries for Medicare Part A (inpatient) services
and carriers for Medicare Part B (outpatient, physician,
clinical laboratory, and medical supplier) services. These
contractors are private insurance companies that contract
with Medicare to process claims from beneficiaries,
providers, and suppliers. Medicare coverage is carried out
at three levels—national, regional, and local.5

STATUTORY AUTHORITY

NATIONAL COVERAGE
DECISION MAKING

Congress established the Medicare program in 1965
with the enactment of title XVIII of the Social Security
Act. While the law provides for the coverage of broad
categories of benefits, such as inpatient hospital care, it
does not include a specific list of services actually
covered. It was inevitable that, over time, particularly
with the development of new technologies, questions
would arise requiring individual coverage determinations. Congress anticipated this need and provided the
secretary of health and human services with the authority to make these decisions. Section 1862 (a)(1)(A) of
the act states:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, no
payment may be made under Part A or Part B for any
expenses incurred for items or services which are not
reasonable and necessary [emphasis added] for the
diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member.

The regulations implementing the “reasonable and
necessary” section of the law [42 CFR 405.310 (k)]
are quite general. Although the criteria that a health
care technology must meet in order to be considered

In addition to the reasonable and necessary requirements, products must typically be deemed to be safe
and effective. In the United States, the FDA is responsible for regulating medical products for safety and
effectiveness, while CMS reviews technologies to
determine whether they will be available (that is,
covered) through the Medicare program for eligible
beneficiaries. How Medicare pays for these products is
a separate issue and depends upon the item and the site
of service. Furthermore, Medicare is frequently asked to
cover “off-label” uses of devices or drugs that have not
been approved by the FDA.

Since Medicare began, fewer than 300 national
coverage decisions—approximately 10 percent—have
been issued. These products typically represent breakthrough technologies, the technologies that have the
potential to affect the most people and have the biggest
impact on the health care system.
According to CMS, national coverage decisions are
defined as “prospective, population-based policies
which describe what patients under what clinical
circumstances are eligible for what items or services
under what conditions.” In a recent presentation, Sean
Tunis, M.D., director of CMS’s Coverage and Analysis
Group, indicated that the following factors could trigger
the national coverage process:







Inconsistent local coverage policies.
Significant advances in medical science.
Substantial disagreement among experts.
Potential for rapid diffusion or overutilization.
Program integrity concerns.
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Over the years, the coverage process itself has been
undergoing a significant evolution. The current Medicare
national coverage process is depicted in Figure 1 (see
page 6).
Once a request is formally submitted and accepted by
CMS (based on its completeness and benefit category),
CMS has set a goal of 90 days to issue a coverage decision memorandum. The 90 days can be extended if, for
example, the requestor submits additional information. A
requestor can be almost anyone, a manufacturer, a physician, a carrier, an advocacy group, a beneficiary, a
congressional inquiry or internal CMS staff, for example.

versy. This controversy has its roots in the past, when
companies and investors criticized the Medicare coverage process for its lack of openness (the proverbial
“black box” of coverage decision making), as well as
for its lack of predictability, lack of precise definitions
and terms, lack of criteria, and lack of an adequate
appeals process. Some of these concerns were addressed during the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and most
recently in 2000, but some still remain.

MCAC: Shining Light inside the Black Box

For those requests that are neither duplicates nor
reconsiderations, CMS must make a determination from
among the following options:

On April 29, 1987, HCFA published a notice (52 FR
15560) in the Federal Register announcing its process
for making coverage decisions. This notice was the
result of Jameson v. Bowen, a lawsuit in which the
plaintiff sued to have HCFA reimburse him for a
percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty procedure performed before a coverage determination had
been made. In addition to reimbursing the plaintiff,
HCFA agreed to publish the notice, thereby explaining
its coverage process.





On January 30, 1989, HCFA published another
proposed rule expanding upon this 1987 notice. The
1989 proposed rule moved to clarify some of the
remaining uncertainty, explaining that

If the request duplicates a pending request, the
requests are typically combined. If it duplicates an
earlier request where a decision was made (that is, a
noncoverage decision), there may or may not be sufficient evidence to reopen the request.



National noncoverage decision.
Issue left to contractor discretion.
National coverage decision with coverage limitations.
National coverage decision without coverage limitations.

Once a determination is made, CMS announces its
decision on its Web site. Based on the decision memo,
CMS then issues coverage instructions, within 60 days,
that are binding on all Medicare contractors and administrative law judges.
To assist with the decision making, CMS relies on
both internal and external resources. Internally, CMS
has medical experts on staff who play a vital role in the
review process. In addition, CMS staff members meet
with stakeholders and conduct literature searches and
reviews (using standard abstraction tools).
When external expertise is called for, CMS staff
have two options. They can request a technology
assessment, a rigorous systematic analysis, from an
impartial third party. Often, this involves AHRQ, which
contracts the assessment to one of its evidence-based
practice centers, or EPCs.
The second option, referring a request to the relatively new entity known as MCAC, the Medicare
Coverage Advisory Committee, has garnered the most
attention and has become a lightning rod for contro-

Although the process by which we make Medicare
coverage determinations on health care technology
has been in place for many years, we believe there are
segments of the population that may still benefit from
a complete description of the coverage decision
making process. We also believe the process should
be more open and that the review of breakthrough
technologies should be streamlined. It is for these
reasons that we are now presenting the coverage
decision process as a public document.

Many experts, however, argued that HCFA’s proposed rule did not go far enough. Further, some of its
elements, such as the cost-effectiveness component, were
highly controversial. A modest effort to issue the 1989
regulation in final form died in 1996, highlighting again
the controversial nature of coverage decision making.
In its most recent effort to open the process, clear up
the uncertainty, and assuage industry concerns, most
notably the concern that the process as it stood did not
comply with the Federal Advisory Commission Act,6
the secretary of health and human services chartered the
Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee on November
24, 1998. MCAC effectively replaced its predecessor
known as the TAC (the Technology Advisory Committee), which was perceived by industry to be the inner
sanctum of the black box of coverage.

Figure 1
Medicare National Coverage Process
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According to the CMS Web site, the Medicare
Coverage Advisory Committee
advises [CMS] on whether medical items and services
are reasonable and necessary under Medicare law. They
perform this task via a careful review and discussion of
specific clinical and scientific issues in an open and
public forum. The MCAC is advisory in nature, with the
final decision on all issues resting with [CMS]. Accordingly, the advice rendered by the MCAC is most useful
when it results from a process of full scientific inquiry
and thoughtful discussion, in an open forum, with
careful framing of recommendations and clear identification of the basis of those recommendations.7

MCAC consists of an Executive Committee and six
panels: the Medical/Surgical Panel, the Drugs/Biologics/
Therapeutics Panel, the Laboratory and Diagnostic
Services Panel, the Medical Devices Panel, the Durable
Medical Equipment Panel, and the Diagnostic Imaging
Panel. The purpose of the Executive Committee is to
provide guidance to the panels. For example, the committee drafted guidelines for evaluating clinical effectiveness.
These guidelines were modified and adopted in early
2001 and are posted on the CMS Web site. The panels use
these guidelines during their deliberations.
Panel meetings are held at different times throughout the year (meeting dates and staff contacts are posted
on the CMS Web site) and are open to the public. These
meetings have time built in for public comment, and
interested parties can present their views orally or
submit them in writing. Each panel consists of a chair
and a vice-chair, voting members, a nonvoting industry
representative, and a consumer representative.
Each MCAC panel “will use certain criteria and
procedures to evaluate the adequacy of the evidence
and the magnitude of clinical benefit in determining the
effectiveness of new medical products and services.”8
While most observers agree that recent improvements
made by CMS—greater openness, more public input,
and clearer procedures—are positive, exactly how CMS
(through the MCAC) makes its coverage decisions and
exactly what it bases those decisions on continues to be
a source of great consternation and controversy.
Some observers have noted that, while the process
itself may not be perfectly transparent up-front, once a
decision has been made, CMS is under great pressure to
prove it did everything absolutely correctly since its
decision memos are universally available once they are
posted on the Internet. CMS must explain its reasoning
and, should an omission of facts or some other mistake
be discovered, there is a reconsideration process in
place.

Coverage Criteria and Evidence-based
Medicine
Shortly before the establishment of MCAC, HCFA
held a Medicare coverage town hall meeting on September 25, 1998, the purpose of which was to address
several of the concerns raised over the years. At that
meeting, a number of new coverage initiatives were
unveiled, including the MCAC.
Also discussed was the promise of a new Federal
Register notice which would rescind the 1989 notice of
proposed rulemaking and update the 1987 Federal
Register notice. On May 16, 2000, HCFA released a
“notice of intent” (NOI), specifying proposed criteria
for determining what is reasonable and necessary, the
statutory basis for coverage determinations. The proposed criteria to be used in considering Medicare
coverage for a new technology included “medical
benefit” and “added value.”
The NOI laid out its four-step process by which the
agency would base its Medicare coverage decisions on
the medical benefit of new technologies and their added
value compared to existing services. This new proposed
coverage algorithm, paraphrased below, took the form
of a coverage decision tree with two branches, one
focused on medical benefit and three on added value:
1. Medical benefit—Is there sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the product or service is medically
beneficial for a particular population?
NO – not covered
YES – move to #2
2. Added value—Does Medicare already cover a medically beneficial service that is in the same clinical
modality for the same condition?
NO – covered
YES – move to #3
3. Added value—Is the new product or service substantially more beneficial, substantially less beneficial, or
just about as beneficial as the same modality product or
service that is already covered?
MORE BENEFICIAL – covered
LESS BENEFICIAL – not covered
ABOUT EQUAL – move to #4
4. Added value—Does the new product or service “result
in equivalent or lower total costs for the Medicare population than the Medicare-covered alternative?”
NO – not covered
YES – covered
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The notion of using cost as a variable in the Medicare
coverage process is anathema to those in the device
industry. In a March 2000 published list of recommended
principles put forward by the Pan Industry Group on
Medicare Coverage, which includes key associations such
as the Advanced Medical Technology Association
(AdvaMed), the Medical Device Manufacturers Association, and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association, among others, the signatories stated that
HCFA has no authority to deny coverage for a treatment because of issues related to cost effectiveness,
and as a policy matter, it should not do so. If economic factors are to be considered, it is more appropriate to do so in the context of payment. HCFA
should rely on market data in setting (and adjusting)
payment levels.

Second only to cost in terms of controversy is the
notion of evidence: How much? What kind? Gathered
in what way? These nuances are critical because they
determine how complex studies must be and how much
and what type of data must be gathered. In his speech
before the International Society of Technology Assessment in Health Care in June 2001, Sean Tunis, M.D.,
stated that “the framework for evaluating clinical
effectiveness is clinical epidemiology, more recently
called evidence-based medicine (EBM).”
The original definition of EBM was developed by
the Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group. Their
thinking about EBM follows:
A new paradigm for medical practice is emerging.
Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition,
unsystematic clinical experience, and patho-physiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical
decision making and stresses the examination of
evidence from clinical research. EBM requires new
skills of the physician, including efficient literature
searching and the application of formal rules of
evidence evaluating the clinical literature.9

Researchers typically refer to the existence of a
hierarchy of evidence, such as the following, developed
by AHRQ and listed from strongest to weakest:






Meta-analysis of multiple, well-designed controlled
studies.
At least one well-designed experimental study.
Well-designed, quasi-experimental studies such as
nonrandomized controlled, single group pre-post,
cohort, time series, or matched case-controlled studies.
Well-designed, nonexperimental studies, such as
comparative and correlational descriptive and case
studies.



Case reports and clinical examples.10

While “the gold standard” among researchers is
generally considered to be blinded, prospective randomized controlled clinical trials, this is not always feasible.
Such a review is particularly problematic for devices.
Some experts point to ethical reasons (that is, one could
not operate on a person needing a pacemaker and not
insert one, for example) as to why these types of studies
are sometimes not possible. Others, however, are of the
opinion that it is admittedly more difficult and more
costly, but not out of the question, to conduct randomized (but not blinded) clinical device trials.
AHRQ administrator John Eisenberg, M.D.,
weighed in on this difficult question in the November
17, 1999, issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association:
Those who conduct technology assessments should be
as innovative in their evaluations as the technologies
themselves. There is little argument that the randomized clinical trial is an accepted high standard for
testing effectiveness under ideal circumstances, but it
may not be the best way to evaluate all the interventions and technologies that decisions makers are
considering.

Therefore, the question becomes what type of and how
much evidence is necessary to make a Medicare coverage
decision? In order to answer the evidence question, the
coverage criteria must be considered. That is, the criteria
require the question, Is there adequate evidence that a
technology is clinically effective and for whom?
The scientific evidence, on the other hand, is the
yardstick or measuring stick for determining the level of
proof necessary to answer the criteria questions. Asking
what type of evidence and how much of it is necessary
to establish “proof” of a technology is, in many ways,
the heart of the coverage matter. In thinking about the
evidence, analysts consider the patient’s condition, the
availability of alternatives, and the risks associated with
a given technology.
While it is difficult to disaggregate the criteria
(which are highly politically charged) from the evidence (which is grounded more heavily in science and
statistics), it is important to distinguish between the
two. The May 2000 NOI mentioned above laid out the
coverage criteria. A proposed rule, however, has yet to
be published.
In the meantime, while CMS continues to grapple
with these very difficult policies, many technologies are
finding their way into the Medicare program through
the local medical review process.
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LOCAL MEDICAL REVIEW POLICY
Although it is the national Medicare coverage
decisions that tend to receive a great deal of attention,
the vast majority of coverage decisions occur at the
local carrier level. In deciding whether or not to cover
a medical service or technology, contractors review
applicable manuals for specific product- or procedurerelated policies supplied by CMS or apply general
criteria such as the following: Is the product safe and
effective? Is it reasonable and necessary? Is it appropriate? Is it experimental or investigational?
Many carriers maintain medical advisory committees comprising local specialists who provide advice on
new procedures and technologies. These advisory
committees, along with medical directors and medical
policy staff of the carriers, play an important role in
reviewing new technologies and making local coverage
decisions. Such decisions are often printed in local
carrier bulletins or newsletters.
The decisions that constitute local medical review
policy have been viewed as a double-edged sword by
many. On the one hand, such decisions are not standardized, since each contractor makes separate decisions that apply only to the area in which that contractor serves. Therefore, a technology that is covered in
one locality may not be in another. From a manufacturer, physician, and patient point of view, this process,
while sometimes confusing and frustrating, allows for
coverage in some circumstances as the technology
diffuses. A national decision, on the other hand, while
uniform and standard, can be a death sentence for a
technology if a national noncoverage determination is
handed down by the CMS central office.11

REGIONAL COVERAGE POLICY
In 1993 and 1994, Medicare Part B claims processing
for certain products was transferred from 34 local carriers
to four regional carriers, known as durable medical
equipment carriers (DMERCs). These carriers process
claims for durable medical equipment, prosthetics,
orthotics, surgical dressings, and a wide array of supplies
used in the patient’s home. Each DMERC issues a
manual with detailed coverage and payment policies on
particular product areas, such as infusion pumps, wheelchairs, and orthopedic support devices.

and Research held a symposium entitled “Making
Coverage Decisions about Emerging Technologies.” At
that symposium, Eisenberg posed the following questions:







How do we take limited resources into consideration
when making coverage decisions?
Should costs enter the decision? If so, how?
How should old technologies be evaluated? Should
they be held to a different standard?
What mechanisms can serve to enhance technology
assessment programs?

QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
In addition to the questions listed above, which are
still relevant, additional questions spring to mind when
thinking about current and future coverage issues.









POLICY QUESTIONS FROM THE PAST
In 1999, the National Institute for Health Care
Management and the Agency for Health Care Policy

What will be the rules of evidence for translating
information into knowledge?



Is CMS the appropriate locus for national Medicare
coverage determinations? (Over the years, entities
entrusted with the responsibility for making technology assessment determinations and/or coverage
decisions, such as the National Center for Health
Care Technology and the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment, have tended to become
sitting political ducks and eventually to be disbanded.)
In defining Medicare coverage criteria, is CMS
required to initiate the formal rulemaking process?
What role, if any, should the MCAC have in defining coverage criteria?
Where should the issue of cost be dealt with—on the
coverage or payment side of the decision-making
process? Some argue that if cost were taken out of
consideration on the coverage side and dealt with on
the payment side, CMS would have no flexibility on
the payment formulas. Is this as it should be?
Should the coverage process come to a screeching
halt when FDA has already approved a technology
but there is inadequate or no scientific evidence
available for the MCAC to review, or should the
technology be allowed to diffuse while data are
collected and analyzed? What can be learned about
the effectiveness of a device while it diffuses?
To what extent do ethical barriers preclude device
clinical trials?
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What are the pros and cons of alternatives to an all or
nothing national coverage determination (for example, conditional coverage or limited coverage)?
Could (or should) a new technology be substituted
for an existing treatment at a lower cost to the
Medicare population? Who should make that
determination?
How much control over data collection is appropriate
for the federal government? What will be the impact
of the recent privacy legislation as it relates to the
coverage process and scientific evidentiary data?
Among its many provisions, the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 contained language for revising the Medicare coverage process
and expanding the process of appealing Medicare
policies and denials of claims. DHHS has, however,
taken the position that sections 521 and 522, which
outline Medicare coverage appeal reforms, should
be delayed for one year from the date of effectiveness. What is the implication of this delay?
What impact could new patients’ bill of rights
legislation have on the Medicare coverage process,
particularly in the area of coverage denials and with
regard to distinguishing between medically necessary and experimental?
On June 7, 2000, President Clinton issued an
executive memorandum directing the DHHS secretary to “explicitly authorize [Medicare] payment for
routine patient care costs . . . and costs due to medical complications associated with participation in
clinical trials.” What are the implications for medical devices?12
Among the many challenges to be addressed in
considering a Medicare prescription drug benefit is
the question of coverage—which drugs will be
covered and paid for under a new benefit? For
purposes of Medicare coverage, how should therapeutic class be defined? How will coverage determinations be made? By whom? How, if at all, will this
be related to the current Medicare coverage process
for devices? If the coverage process for prescription
drugs is not within the purview of CMS, what does
this portend for devices? Will there be two separate
entities, with two separate processes making separate coverage decisions, one for drugs and one for
devices? How will coverage decisions for combination products (that is, drug-device products) be
made? Where do biotech products fit into all this?
What role, if any, will local carriers have?
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